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 Abstract 
 
After years of neglect, Lebanon is facing the consequences of a struggling water sector. Existing water 
networks are deficient; water supply continuity is low; most wastewater is discharged into rivers or 
the Mediterranean Sea without adequate treatment; and inter-agency coordination remains weak 
and fragmented. In 2000, the government together with international donor agencies initiated a 
reform process to re-structure the water sector, merging local water authorities into four regional 
Water Establishments and giving more weight to the Ministry of Water and Energy. The water sector 
reforms pushed for good governance and the marketization of water services. The implementation 
process of the reforms, however, has been contested, modified and transformed by different political 
actors. 
 
This thesis takes a closer look at the water sector reforms in Lebanon, mapping key actors, their roles 
and responsibilities, their interests and interrelationships, and their influence in the sector. It seeks to 
understand the dynamics that underpin the institutional and policy set-up in the sector. For this 
purpose, the thesis makes use of an analytical framework for political economy analysis, 
contextualizing the reforms in the broader political and economic context. What drives and what 
constrains changes in water governance in Lebanon? 
 
A particular focus is put on the World Bank and other donor agencies, the Council for Development 
and Reconstruction (CDR) and the municipalities. They are key actors in the water sector and yet they 
have been largely disregarded by the reforms. The thesis explores how these actors interact and 
influence decision-making processes in the Lebanese sector. The Foucauldian notion of 
governmentality thereby serves as a method of inquiry, explaining how forms of political rationality 
inscribe themselves in practices, and by extension, in the political economy. 
 
Keywords: water governance, political economy, water sector reforms, Lebanon, stakeholder analysis, 
power relations, wastewater, water resources management 
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1. Introduction  
 
Strategically positioned between major Middle Eastern powers and the Mediterranean Sea, Lebanon 
has been at the centre of political and social developments in the region. As a mid-income country 
with a continuously improving Human Development Index (HDI) in the high human development 
category, Lebanon has the potential to manage its water resources in a way that ensures human and 
ecosystem health (UNDP 2009). 
 
Yet, water supply is intermittent. As a result of deficient infrastructure and inefficient resource 
management, water losses are high (WB 2009). Water quality is adversely affected by saltwater 
intrusion and bacterial contamination of up to 70 percent of all natural water resources (UNDP 
2010:60). Less than 8 percent of all wastewater is collected and treated, resulting in the contamination 
of fresh water resources and the Mediterranean Sea (GTZ 2009). Wastewater management in 
particular has played a subordinate role in the water sector in Lebanon. Most of the raw sewage is 
directly discharged into the rivers or the Mediterranean Sea (Geara et al. 2010). As a result, Lebanon’s 
water sources are heavily polluted, putting public and ecosystem health at risk. There are several 
wastewater treatment plants (WWTP) in place or under construction, but their operation and 
maintenance has proven difficult. Meanwhile, wastewater has remained low on the priority list of the 
responsible government institutions.  
 
In 2000, Lebanon began a reform process to remedy some of the shortcomings in the water sector. A 
new Water Law – Law 221 – was passed to re-configure existing governance arrangements by merging 
twenty-one water authorities (WA) into four regional water establishments (WE) under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) (GTZ 2009). The reforms were an attempt to re-scale 
governance responsibilities and to include private market actors in the sector (Del Moral et al. 2003). 
As such, they reflected a more global debate on water governance that prioritized market-based 
management approaches.  
 
The Lebanese water sector is characterized by a history of laissez-faire economics and lack of central 
planning (Denoeux & Springborg 1998). During the Ottoman rule, a highly centralized system of 
governance was put in place that tried to accommodate the multi-ethnical and multi-confessional 
make-up of Lebanon (Giotti 2004). This system remained intact throughout the French mandate, 
though the management of public utilities was handed over to private, mostly foreign investors. This 
marked the beginning of a general trend of de-regulation and lack of central planning in Lebanon. 
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During the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1990, the management of public utilities became even 
more fragmented as the conflict permeated into decision-making processes (Féré  2007). Control over 
water resources was thereby seen as strategic vantage point in the struggle over territorial control 
(Ibid.). As a consequence, privately drilled wells and unlicensed water vendors developed as 
alternative supply systems. Even today, twenty-two years after the war, people rely on these 
alternative sources for drinking water (WB 2009; USAID 2010).1 While these informal arrangements 
might compensate for shortcomings on the supply-side of water management, the challenge of 
developing and implementing a holistic approach to water resource management remains.  
 
It is within the context of these formal and informal governance arrangements that water sector 
reforms were to be implemented in 2000. The reform process was influenced by the global water 
governance debate, aiming to transform certain governance structures and processes (Swyngedouw 
2005). Greater emphasis was placed on private economic actors and the market assumed a central 
role within the broader political-economic system (Harvey 2005). In Lebanon, Law 221 and the 
subsequent by-laws established the WE as financially and administratively autonomous entities, based 
on principles of cost recovery and a user-pays tariff system. The introduction of water and wastewater 
tariffs was to be legitimized by improved services and good customer relations. Rather than a 
withdrawal of the state, the reforms initiated a process of fundamental transformation of the relations 
between the state, the market and civil society.  
 
Untouched by the reforms, the Lebanese state continues to depend on foreign funding as 70 percent 
of all projects in the water sector are externally financed (WB 2010).2 These foreign donors mostly 
work together with the Council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR), a type of super-ministry 
that is only accountable to the Council of Ministry and that maintains an investment budget outside 
that of the government (Hariri 2011). Given their influence on the allocation of funds, planning and 
investment strategies in Lebanon are strongly influenced by the interests of foreign donors – from 
East and West – as well as by those of a single governmental agency, the CDR. Largely unchallenged 
by the reforms, the governance structures and processes of Lebanon’s wastewater sector remain 
intricately linked to economic and political concentrations of power, and to economic and political 
interests, strategies and decisions, as well as to the means by which subjects are governed (Moncrieffe 
& Luttrell 2005). 
 
                                                          
1 Figures on households purchasing drinking water from alternative sources vary from a national average of 79% according 
to a USAID/DAI study to 47% according to the World Bank. Both studies show strong regional variations. 
2 World Bank statistics from 1992 to 2008 as published in the 2010 World Bank Public Expenditure Review. 
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1.1. Thesis Rationale 
 
This thesis takes a closer look at the water sector reforms in Lebanon, mapping key actors, their roles 
and responsibilities, their interests and interrelationships, and their influence in the sector. It seeks to 
understand the dynamics that underpin the institutional and policy set-up. For this purpose, the thesis 
makes use of an analytical framework for political economy analysis, contextualizing the reforms in 
the broader political and economic context (Moncrieffe & Luttrell 2005). What drives and what 
constrains changes in water governance in Lebanon? 
 
Drawing on the notion of governmentality, the thesis first explores how the ideas and principles of 
global water governance, as advocated by the World Bank and other donors, manifested themselves 
in the reform process. Although a perceptible shift towards more market-centric approaches and good 
governance is evident in theory, the reality looks slightly different. The political economy analysis then 
provides insights into the dynamics that actually make and shape the water sector in Lebanon 
(O’Meally 2009). It helps to explain a gradual transformation of the sector towards a more 
decentralized and market-centric “political rationality” (Lemke 2001:203).  A particular focus is placed 
on the wastewater sub-sector during the analysis. 
 
Throughout the thesis, the water sector is considered to be an integral part of a broader, complex and 
dynamic socio-environmental system characterized by social, political, economic and cultural relations 
on the one hand, and the hydrological cycle on the other (Swyngedouw 2009). Any changes in the 
water sector should thus be considered within the broader context of the socio-environmental system 
in which they exist (Ibid.). 
1.2. Research Questions 
 
The thesis explores the following research questions in an attempt to understand the dynamics of 
change of the water sector in Lebanon. 
 
 Ideas: In what ways have the ideas and principles of global water governance influenced the 
water sector reforms in Lebanon? 
 Actors and agendas: Who are key actors, their roles and responsibilities, their interests and 
interrelationships, and their influence in the water sector? 
 Structures and processes: How have existing governance structures and processes drive, or 
constrain, changes in the Lebanese water sector? 
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1.3. Methodological Approach 
 
The thesis has been designed as a qualitative, explanatory study based on academic articles and books, 
policy documents, reports and expert interviews (Table 1). These were evaluated and analysed during 
a four-month long field study, using a DFID-commissioned framework for political economy analysis 
(see Figure 1; Moncrieffe & Luttrell 2005).   
1.4. Methods 
 
Literature and Document Review  
 
A review of academic literature and policy documents was conducted as an initial scoping exercise to 
understand the problems of the wastewater sector in Lebanon (Bryman 2008). A more in-depth review 
helped to contextualize these problems in a broader historical-institutional context. It also provided 
some insights into the governance arrangements in Lebanon, and their impact on the wastewater 
sector.  
 
The documents were selected on the basis of their relevance to the research. Drawing on different 
disciplines, the literature review included a range of articles from political science to hydrology. While 
it was easy to get access to the relevant literature, most of the policy papers and reports were not 
accessible online. The Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) provided several of the reports upon 
request but did not to share specific maps and statistics. The review was useful to gain a broader 
perspective on wastewater management (Flick 2009).  
Interviews 
 
The expert interviews provided unique insights into the dynamics between different actors, as well as 
their interest, ideas and perceptions of each other (Flick 2009). As such, the interviews served as basis 
for a more detailed analysis of the key actors. The interviewees also shared some of their practical 
experience from the field, substantiating my analysis of the political economy of the wastewater 
sector. 
 
The interviews were subjective in that the experts shared their particular views, which I then 
interpreted and assigned meaning to. Acknowledging interpretivism as my epistemological 
standpoint, I tried to “grasp the subjective meaning” of the interviews (Bryman 2008:694). I recognize 
that I may have influenced the views and behaviour of the interviewees, and they may have influenced 
mine. At the same time, the interviewing process allowed me to understand the world from the 
perspective of the interviewee (Flick 2009). 
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1.5. Political Economy Analysis Framework by DFID 
 
I used the DFID-commissioned framework to analyse the academic literature, policy documents and 
interviews from a political economy perspective (Moncrieffe & Luttrell 2005). The framework helped 
to examine the interrelationships and interests of different actors in the water sector in a structured 
manner. The political economy analysis shed light on some of the structures and processes influencing 
policy outcomes and sector development. There are three parts to this analysis (Figure 1). 
 
First, a basic country analysis helped to establish the broader historical-institutional context in which 
the water sector is situated. This was done through an initial review of academic literature, but has 
not been included in the thesis. This is described in Chapter 2. 
 
The second part of the analysis looked at how institutions and actors interact and how their 
interactions influence policy formulation and implementation. I identified the key actors and the 
nature of their relationships (see Chapters 5.1.). Then, I mapped their interrelationships and influence 
on each other (see Chapter 5.2). Finally, I used the analytical matrix for a political economy analysis as 
Table 1: Overview of Methods 
 Literature and Document Review  Expert Interviews 
Purpose  To identify key actors, their roles & responsibilities, interests & ideas, interrelationships & influence 
 To understand how power and resources are distributed and contested in different contexts 
 To uncover underlying economic and political interests, strategies and decisions, as well as the 
means by which subjects are governed 
Data Sources Academic Journals and Publications, Books, Policy 
Documents and Strategies, Reports, Census Data 
Semi-structured expert interviews 
Data Type Theoretical foundations; statistics, maps, detailed 
list of actors/wastewater projects 
Narratives, quotes 
Data Quantity 
and Quality 
A comprehensive review of relevant documents. 
Peer-reviewed and authoritative publications only 
to ensure quality 
12 expert interviews 
Pertinence Compilation of accumulated knowledge that 
pertains to the different components of the 
research project. Demonstrates what is known and 
what needs to be explored further (Silverman, 
2010: 321); unobtrusive 
Collection of expert opinions &practical knowledge 
for 
 Exploratory, thematic study of water sector 
 Data generation 
 Development of a theoretical understanding 
of governance structures and processes (Flick 
2009:166) 
Benefits By acknowledging what is already known, a generic 
understanding of the system can be ascertained. 
Also, research focus can be on new or unknown 
components of the system, reducing repetition 
and saving time (Silverman, 2010) 
Pragmatically oriented, qualitative research. 
Problem focused, systematized and reflexively 
accessible 
Limitations Documents and literature review help establish a 
general understanding, but do little to facilitate 
creation of new knowledge or innovative ideas. 
Prescriptive solutions are difficult when dealing 
with literature review alone. 
Interviews are by nature subjective and difficult to 
measure quantitatively. Difficulty in identifying and 
contacting interviewees, time pressure during 
interview, ignorance or lack of expertise, 
unwillingness to respond to questions, ‘lecture’ on 
topic rather than interview (“rhetoric interview”), 
problem of confidentiality 
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proposed by DFID (see Table 4; Moncrieffe & Luttrell 2005). The matrix offered a way to examine the 
sector in terms of historical and structural legacies, power relations and distribution, ideas, values and 
perceptions, interests and incentives, as well as leadership and management (Edelmann 2009).  
 
The third part seeks to define the operational implications of the analysis for future policies by 
identifying entry points and modes of support (Edelmann 2009). I did not make any recommendations 
about how development should be done, but I mentioned several points for further consideration. 
 
Figure 1: Framework for a Sector-Based Political Economy Analysis 
 
 
1.3. Limitations 
 
There are several limitations in the research design, as well as the analytical framework.  
 The expert interviews were sometimes difficult to arrange, and required that the interview 
partner had a good grasp of the wastewater sector (Kvale 1996). The range of interviewees 
was limited to a few government institutions and donor agencies that were willing to 
participate. In light of this, the interviews have been used as a supplementary source of 
information. 
 By focusing on three actors in particular, I only provided a partial analysis of the political 
economy. This is not to say that other aspects are not important, but the scope of this paper 
does not suffice for a truly comprehensive analysis.  
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 Moreover, the analytical framework does not provide any theoretical explanations for the 
relevance of the different aspects of the matrix. Although it is useful to map out the actors 
and their interrelationships, it does not explain how and why they are interrelated. It also does 
not give any suggestions on how to define the operational implications and determine entry 
points. I have therefore used the concept of neo-liberal governmentality to make sense of the 
outcomes of the political economy analysis. 
 Finally, the analysis reflects the current state of the water sector in Lebanon. As the situation 
might be completely change in the next few years (especially after the implementation of the 
NWSS), the study has limited temporal relevance.  
2. Water in Lebanon 
 
2.1. Key development challenges in the water sector 
 
Compared to its neighbours, Lebanon is relatively water-rich. Generally, the country can be divided 
into two hydrological zones: the Mediterranean coastline and the mountainous inland (Geara et al. 
2010). Most of the Lebanon’s water resources come from precipitation and snowmelt. Water 
availability is highly seasonal as about 90% of all precipitation occurs in the winter months, while the 
summers are usually very hot and dry (Geara et al. 2010). This results in yearly water shortages as 
water demand is the highest during the summer months when supply is at its lowest. There are also 
regional differences in precipitation patters. The Bekaa Valley, a region known for its agriculture, is 
the warmest and driest area in Lebanon with an annual rainfall of 250 to 750mm (ACS 2007).  
 
Lebanon has thirteen perennial rivers, the biggest of which is the Litani River (MOE-UNDP 2011). 
Groundwater has historically played the role of buffer to cope with the aforementioned seasonal 
water shortages. Reports of overexploitation and dropping water tables have become more and more 
frequent. Nevertheless, there have not been any systematic studies on groundwater availability since 
the 1970s, but it seems very likely that the natural recharge rate has been surpassed due to an 
excessive over-extraction of groundwater in the coastal areas (El Fadel & Sadek 2000).3  
 
Despite their relative abundance, water resources in Lebanon are under increasing pressure from 
rapid population growth, urbanization, economic development and climate change. Current water 
demand is variably estimated in the range of 1,472 to 1,539 million m3 per year, whereby the 
                                                          
3 There are officially 22 500 unlicensed wells (compared to 20 324 licensed wells) that are largely responsible for the 
over-extraction. 
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agricultural sector uses about 60% of total water available (UNDP 2010; FAO 2008). As climate change 
exacerbates inter- and intra-annual variation, and as a growing urban population demands more 
household water, pressure on Lebanon’s resources will increase in the future. Nevertheless, there is 
a chronic lack of data in Lebanon, so that even basic statistics on population size or irrigation 
consumption are mere estimates. While there are only estimates about the size of Lebanon’s 
population, ranging from 3.8 million to 6 million people, it is clear that it is growing with half of the 
population being under the age of 29 (UNDP 2010).4 This means that there will not only be an increase 
in demand for fresh water, but also for new housing units that all require access to water and 
wastewater infrastructure (Ibid.).  
 
Growing urbanization is expected to increase pollution through untreated wastewater and solid waste 
(Geara et al. 2010). This is particularly true for the highly urbanized coastal area where 59% of the 
population lives (Ibid.). In this area, seawater intrusion and pollution of aquifers has become a real 
problem, too (Saadeh 2008). The situation is further exacerbated by economic growth that drives the 
demand for water, and consequently, for wastewater management. Finally, climate change is 
expected to affect precipitation patterns, resulting in changes in water availability and quality, 
groundwater recharge and surface run-off (MOE-UNDP 2011). 
 
The largest share of freshwater (two-thirds) is withdrawn for agricultural purposes. Agriculture is a 
small and declining share of the economy but it is crucial for rural livelihoods, providing employment 
to more than 25 percent of the population (FAO Aquastat 2014). It therefore is of strategic importance 
to balance agricultural water demands with those of other sectors, and to ensure the sustainable end 
efficient use of water resources.  
 
Currently, priority is given to access to drinking water. Supply networks still only cover between 62% 
and 87% depending on the region (CDR 2005; ACS 2007). Around 50% of these networks require 
maintenance, resulting in intermittent water supply and additional expenses, especially for lower 
socio-economic groups (MOEW 2010). As highlighted by the National Poverty Targeting Program 
(2013), low-income households spend eight percent of total household expenditures on ensuring 
access to water supply at home. 
 
Wastewater network connection rates are even lower at an average of 52% in 2004, ranging from 
89.3% in Greater Beirut and 33.9% in Mount Lebanon (WB 2009). An expansion and improvement of 
                                                          
4 Population growth in Lebanon is estimated between 1% to 2.5% depending on the source (UNDP 2010). 
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current wastewater networks carries high investment and operating costs. Currently, there are two 
pre-treatment plants for wastewater and thirty-one WWTP for wastewater; another thirty are 
planned or under construction (Geara et al. 2010).  
 
Because of the civil war, wastewater management has been sporadic with little coordination at 
national level (El Fadel & Massoud 2001). Traditionally, Lebanese municipalities have been responsible 
for urban drainage of both storm water and wastewater. Many urban drainage systems are designed 
to discharge into the closest natural channel or watercourse with little attempt to identify the most 
appropriate location in terms of costs and environmental impact.  
 
Map 1: Wastewater infrastructure in Lebanon (Source: MoEW and author) 
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2.2. The wastewater sub-sector 
 
Because there is no functional wastewater management system in Lebanon, most of the raw sewage 
is directly discharged into the Mediterranean Sea, rivers, bottomless septic tanks, or used for irrigation 
purposes. As a result, Lebanon’s coastal, surface and underground water sources are heavily polluted, 
endangering public and ecosystem health (Geara et al. 2010).5 All water resources are affected by 
bacteriological contamination, yet the situation is particularly dramatic in agricultural areas where 
run-off from fertilizers and pesticides has infiltrated ground water resources (UNDP 2010).  As a main 
source, the quality of groundwater pollution is directly linked to drinking water quality (Saad et al. 
2003). Similarly, industrial pollution from untreated wastewater has also contributed to a 
deterioration of water quality (UNDP 2010). 
 
Wastewater management is needed to protect public health, as well as water resources and 
ecosystems. The challenge for Lebanon is to develop and implement low-cost, but effective and 
sustainable measures to manage wastewater (Moe & Rheingans 2006). Together with donor agencies, 
the Lebanese government has now started to, take steps to rehabilitate wastewater infrastructure, 
construct wastewater treatment plants and set-up decentralized cluster systems in rural areas (GTZ 
2009).  
 
In light of increasing water demands, there has been a shift from a “linear” approach to wastewater 
management systems towards integrated, closed-loop systems (Daigger 2008). Ultimately, the 
objective is to reuse treated wastewater, and thereby reduce the net removal of water from the 
hydrological cycle (Moe & Rheingans 2006; MEDAWARE et al., 2004).). There is much potential for 
innovative and proactive approaches to wastewater management, helping to reduce pressure on 
freshwater resources by maximizing reuse opportunities (Massoud et al. 2009; Bogner et al. 2007; 
Daigger 2008). Nevertheless, it is difficult to implement these in a country where Plan B - of discharging 
wastewater into rivers and the sea - is still the preferred option.  
2.3. Current wastewater management system  
 
The management of these water resources has been largely decentralised, owning to the laissez-faire 
politics of the central government and later, the Lebanese Civil War. Wastewater collection, treatment 
and disposal has traditionally been the responsibility of local authorities.  Existing sewer networks in 
Lebanon are operated and maintained by the municipalities.  
                                                          
5 Multiple studies have shown high levels of bacteria (esp. coliform and E.Coli) and toxins in rivers and along to 
coastline. The Ministry of Health estimates about 260 children (10% of all child deaths) die every year from diarrheal 
diseases linked to inadequate drinking water and sanitation (Geara et al. 2010). 
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Under the Lebanese legal framework, however, the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) is 
responsible for preparing and updating a national wastewater master plan. The first one was prepared 
in 1982 by Camp Dresser Mc-Kee and Khatib & Alami Consulting Engineers, and updated in 1994-5 as 
“Lebanon’s staged WW program” (GTZ 2010). Nevertheless, these plans have two main deficiencies: 
a) population estimates are uncertain as only official, very low figures were used for reference due to 
political reasons, and b) the plans were devised when South Lebanon was still under occupation by 
Israel (Ibid.). The plans were never fully adopted.  
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A new wastewater master plan is now being developed as part of the reform process of the water 
sector, which also been identified as a key strategic objective in the NWSS (MoEW 2012). The NWSS 
has set a very ambitious target of increasing the rate of wastewater collection and treatment to 95% 
by 2020, although it is unclear how this will be achieved (see Map 2; GTZ 2009).  
 
So far, four financially and administratively regional public utilities, or Water Establishments (WE), 
have been created to manage water supply and wastewater (GTZ 2009). These are South Lebanon WE, 
North Lebanon WE, Beirut and Mount Lebanon WE, and Beka’a WE (see Map 1).  The Southern WE is 
the only WE that has prepared a regional wastewater master plan (USAID).  
 
Some municipalities have their own small treatment facilities but most of these are out of order. Two 
large pre-treatment plants for WW exist (Al Ghadir and Saida) and over thirty additional Wastewater 
Treatment Plants (WWTPs) either exist or are under construction (see projects list in Annex 5).  
 
Wastewater projects in Lebanon are usually funded by external development agencies and 
implemented through the Council for Reconstruction and Development (CDR). The WEs are not 
involved during the planning and construction period. No wastewater tariffs are in place and it is 
unclear how wastewater operating costs will be financed after the systems are handed over to the 
WEs. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Governance describes the structures and processes by which policies are formulated and 
implemented; by which management strategies and practices are determined; and by which 
sustainability objectives are defined. In the context of this thesis, understanding governance is an 
analytical exercise of outlining approaches to resource management and of identifying key actors and 
interrelationships (Scoones et al. 2007).  
 
Governance systems are complex and constantly changing (Leach et al. 2007). While this thesis tries 
to capture some this complexity and change, it remains a snapshot in time.  Focusing on the Lebanese 
water sector, it covers historical developments and future plans as reported by April 2012. 
Nonetheless, these space and time specific findings hold great relevance to a broader context when 
linked and analysed in a theoretical framework.  
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This section will therefore theorize about governance and sustainability, highlighting some of the 
current trends of global water governance from a political economy perspective. Referring to the 
Dublin Principles, it will explain the link between these trends and the neo-liberal water governance 
regime. By noticing a transformation of the role of the state, the market and civil society, it will explore 
how these emerging forms of governance impact wastewater management strategies and practices. 
3.1. Governance and Sustainability 
 
In its broadest sense, governance can be defined as the structures, processes and actors that shape 
and are shaped by the interactions of people, technology and environment (Leach et al. 2007). 
Governance influences how scientific knowledge and technology is used and produced; how social 
and environmental problems are defined and addressed; and how the impacts of socio-environmental 
changes affect the world we live in (Elzen et al. 2005). At the same time, governance processes are 
highly contested as different people and groups value and frame what is to be sustained, for whom 
and how, over what time and spatial scale in different, and often contradictory, ways. As Jerneck et 
al. (2011) argue, understanding these processes helps to understand socio-environmental systems of 
governance, and their implications for sustainability. 
 
Sustainability science can help explain the dynamic and complex interlinkages between humans and 
nature (Clark & Dickson 2003). It can provide insights into the impact of governance structures and 
processes on these interlinkages, and it can offer guidance on how to address complex sustainability 
challenges (Lucht 2002). In light of increasing populations and development pressures, an analysis of 
governance can shed light on what kind of institutions we need to govern our resources more 
sustainably (Dietz et al. 2003).  
 
Thus, governance opens up a broader analytical agenda that looks at the role of state, market and civil 
society actors and their interrelationships. In water governance, there has been a general shift away 
from public service delivery (which emphasizes the role of the state) to market-centric models and 
recently, multi-stakeholder models, which directly involve civil society actors (Miranda 2011). 
Swyngedouw (2005) points out that these different models present ideal versions of interactions of 
state, market and civil society actors, obscuring the inherently political nature of water governance. 
Thus, one of the challenges within sustainability science is to develop an analytical framework that 
links the political dimension of water governance to broader developments in the socio-
environmental system. 
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There are a number of frameworks put forth to analyze the sustainability of governance systems, such 
as Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework or transition theory (Ostrom 
2009; Rotmans et al. 2001; Loorbach 2010). In general, these frameworks do not adequately address 
the political dimension of governance that is characterized by the interactions of different actors 
within a specific political-economic context (Meadowcroft 2009). This dimension, however, is 
captured by an analysis of the political economy. 
3.2. Political Economy and Governmentality 
 
An analysis of the political economy of water governance can provide useful insights into the 
interactions between political and economic processes (Edelmann 2009). Examining how power and 
resources are distributed and contested in different contexts, it can uncover underlying economic and 
political interests, strategies and decisions, as well as the means by which subjects are governed 
(O’Meally 2009). 
 
While there are numerous interpretations of what constitutes a political economy, this thesis draws 
on Foucault (1991) to explain the political and economic processes of governance. Unlike materialist 
perspectives that centre their argument on the relations of the economy and the state, Foucault does 
not separate between the two spheres (Lemke 2002). He does not differentiate between the economy 
and politics, between the state and society, because fundamentally they are all shaped by power 
relations (Foucault 1991). For Foucault, power is omnipresent (Foucault 1984). As such, the political 
economy is merely an expression of the power relations that constitute it (Barnett 2010; Callinicos 
2007).6 
 
In this thesis, the Foucauldian notion of neo-liberal governmentality will serve as a method of inquiry 
into the political economy of water governance. Foucault has used the term governmentality to 
describe, “How forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what 
role they play within them” (Foucault 1991: 79). As such, it can explain the transformation of 
governance arrangements under neo-liberal rule. Neo-liberalism is thereby understood as a market-
centric form of political-economic governance (Larner 2000).  
 
Specifically, neo-liberal governmentality refers to the “techniques of governing”, that underpin 
governance structures and processes (Swyngedouw 2005:1997). It explains the transformation of 
governance arrangements “excavating a changing role of the state in, and the reshaping of governing 
                                                          
6 Foucault used the term dispositif of power-knowledge to describe the underlying conceptual structure of power 
relations (Callinicos 2007). 
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under, neo-liberalism” (Ibid.: 1997). Neo-liberal governmentality problematizes the state by re-
defining the competences of the state in view of the market and civil society actors (Lemke 2002). This 
does not indicate a retreat of the state, but a fundamental transformation of power relations that is 
predicated on the expansion of the economic sphere (Ibid.). Instilling a view of the world that values 
the economic over the social, neo-liberalism is perhaps best described as a political project that that 
diffuses and consolidates a market-centric model of governance (Lemke 2002; Swyngedouw 2005; 
Rose & Miller 2010).  
3.3. Global Water Governance  
 
What is Global Water Governance? 
 
Global water governance refers to the governance system that emerged during the 1992 International 
Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin, and was re-affirmed at the Earth Summit in Rio 
de Janeiro (Dobner 2010). At the conference in Dublin, a set of guiding principles was prepared to 
address issues of water scarcity (WB WRSS 2004). These principles-  the Dublin Principles – have come 
to represent the neo-liberal water governance regime. 
 
So what are these principles? First is the ecological principle that declares water as a finite resource 
that needs to be managed holistically and sustainably. The second principle focuses on the importance 
of participatory approaches, while the third principle highlights the central role of women in water 
development and management. Finally, the fourth principle establishes water as an economic good 
(WMO 1992).  
 
Petra Dobner (2010) argues that the Dublin Principles marked the beginning of a paradigm shift in 
global water governance, after which an economic valuation of water gradually became the norm. 
This is not to say that the Dublin Principles were undisputed. In fact, the 1992 Rio Conference explicitly 
discussed the social implications of water management. However, rather than contributing to a more 
balanced interpretation of the Dublin Principles, the ensuing debate has been ideologically charged, 
according to Dobner. Two main camps emerged; one speaking out in favour of the marketization of 
water resources and services and the other one opposing this. Politically, the latter has manifested 
itself in human-rights approaches to water, and in social movements and local struggles against 
privatization (Bakker 2003; Dobner 2010).  
 
Meanwhile, the fourth principle of the Dublin Statement has come to dominate much of the water 
discourse and policy, often described as the global “consensus” on water governance. As the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reflects,  
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An international consensus in policy regarding water management has 
emerged, based on growing concerns about efficiency in the use of 
government and donor resources, disappointing outcomes from past 
efforts, and greater awareness of environmental issues… The policy 
consensus has also been shaped by a reorientation of the development 
cooperation agenda that has resulted, among other issues, in greater focus 
on institutional reform, participation, and involvement of civil society and 
the private sector (Turner et al. 2004). 
 
This global “consensus” is represented by a strategic policy network of different international 
organizations like the World Bank, NGOs, transnational corporations, water experts and analysts, who 
have set the agenda for global water governance (Dobner 2010).7,8 Its agenda is consistent with neo-
liberal ideas of water governance as it advocates a restructuring of the water sector in favour of private 
economic and civil society actors (Mollinga 2008a).  
 
Crucially, the Dublin Principles recognize the economic value of water both as a resource and as a 
service (WMO 1992). The market is seen as the most efficient means for valuing water (Tyler 2007). 
Accordingly, the market price of water should reflect the full financial and resource costs, and should 
be paid by the users of water resources and services (WB 2010). The emphasis of market mechanisms 
in water management corresponds to a general trend of liberalization and marketization (Dobner 
2010; Jerneck et al. 2011). It encourages a restructuring of the water sector in line with “an idealized 
image of private sector”, argues Bakker (2003: 361). It implies an involvement of private economic 
actors and in the water sector; a commercialization of public utilities and an externalisation of state 
functions through deregulation and decentralization (Bakker 2003; Swyngedouw 2005). 
 
At the same time, the Dublin Principles emphasize stakeholder participation as a means to legitimize 
and democratize governance processes. Potentially, participatory approaches to governance can 
provide fresh impetus for innovation and change (Saravanan et al. 2009). However, this potential is 
undermined by what Erik Swyngedouw (2005: 1999) calls “the democratic deficit of governance-
beyond-the state”. He points out the contradictory nature of such governance arrangements that can 
make it more difficult for civil society actors to engage in governing processes. The influence of so-
called stakeholders depends on the extent to which they are involved in decision-making processes 
(Swyngedouw 2006). The structure of representation is also important as it relates to the form of 
representation (e.g. from consultation to direct voting rights) and the way in which stakeholders can 
engage (e.g. as individuals or groups, ad hoc or through regularized processes) (Swyngedouw 2005). 
                                                          
7 Petra Dobner provides an in-depth analysis of these global policy networks in her book Wasserpolitik. 
8 The 2004 World Bank Water Resources Sector Strategy explicitly refers to the Dublin Principles. 
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These are often non-transparent and unaccountable because of a lack of clear decision-making 
mechanisms. Moreover, participation is invariably mediated by power with some stakeholders being 
more influential than others (Swyngedouw 2006). He concludes that governance-beyond-the state is 
“decidedly Janus-faced” in that it continues to exclude actors of a particular kind from participating 
(2005: 2002). This resonates with Saravanan, who claims that the innovative potential of participatory 
approaches to water management is obscured by standardized, linear principles and policy reform 
(Saravanan et al. 2009: 83).  
 
Notably, there has been a transformation of governance arrangements in recent history, assigning a 
greater role to private economic actors on one hand, and civil society on the other (Jessop 1998; Hajer 
2003; Swyngedouw 2005). These different actors, engaging at different levels and across multiples 
scales, form horizontal networks of governance that mark a break from traditional, hierarchical and 
bureaucratic state forms (Leach 2007). Seemingly, these networked forms of governance allow for 
more inclusive and participatory approaches to governance. Nevertheless, the transformation of 
governance has not necessarily empowered civil society. Rather it has subjected it to neo-liberal 
market rule, reducing the role of civil society to that of commodity consumption and replacing citizens’ 
rights to water with consumer rights (Castro 2008). 
 
Implementing the Dublin Principles 
 
The Dublin Principles have been interpreted in a way that reflects neo-liberal ideas of institutional 
reform of the water sector. Explicitly advocating market-based approaches to water management, 
neo-liberalism seems to encroach and set the rules of the game (Clarke 2008). The Principles have 
been operationalized through Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM).  
 
Widely acclaimed by many international organizations, IWRM has been purposefully designed as a 
management tool for water resources (Hartje 2008). In line with the first of the Dublin principles, it 
presents an integrated approach to water management that links social and economic development 
with environmental protection (GWP 2012). For this reason, three basic pillars for implementing 
IWRM have been developed. These are: 
 
 Management instruments, such as environmental impact assessments, market-based 
regulatory mechanisms or water-efficient technologies; 
 Enabling environment, e.g. through good governance, cost recovery policies and polluter-
pays principles; 
 Institutional framework, e.g., of public-private partnerships and river basin management 
(Hassing & Clausen 2009).  
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All three of these pillars have a strong focus on market-centric approaches to water management, 
indicating that the fourth principle on the economic valuation of water has usurped much of the 
management discourse. As an operational management tool, IWRM shapes water management 
practices and strategies, and effectively helps to implement a market-centric model of water 
governance.  
 
So far, this section has been largely abstract and universal in nature. This thesis will now look at how 
the Dublin Principles have been transposed in the particular context of the water sector in Lebanon. 
Taking a closer look at the wastewater sub-sector, in what ways have the Dublin Principles shaped 
wastewater management strategies and practices in Lebanon? How were they adapted and 
interpreted in the specific historic-institutional context of the country? Is there some validity to the 
concerns raised about the “Janus-faced” transformation of governance structures and processes?  
4. Ideas behind the water sector reforms 
 
This section looks at how the global water governance debate influenced the water sector reforms in 
Lebanon. To what extent have the ideas of the so-called global consensus on water governance 
contributed to a configuration of governance structures and processes of “rule-making, rule-setting 
and rule implementation” (Hajer 2003:175)? What role did the Dublin Principles play?  
 
In Lebanon, the World Bank has positioned itself as key actor in the water sector and as supporter of 
the ideas and principles of global water governance. Globally, the Bank worked on numerous strategy 
papers that actively promoted the Dublin Principles. In Lebanon, it played an active role in the water 
sector reforms not only initiating, but actively shaping the reform process.  Together with other 
donors, it pushed for the adoption of good governance principles as well as for market-based 
approaches to water management.9  
 
In order to establish how the global water governance debate has shaped the water sector reforms in 
Lebanon, the World Bank Water Resource Sector Strategy (WRSS) and two of the main policy 
documents stemming from the reform process, namely Law 221 and the National Water Sector 
                                                          
9 While the World Bank has made large investments in the water sector, there are few, publicly available documents of 
the Bank’s involvement in the actual reform process. One of the few I have found is a WB Project Information Document 
of the Beka’a Emergency Water Supply Project (Report No. AB2980) from 2007 in which the Bank states that it has 
been “actively engaged in Lebanon’s water sector since 1993”. The important role of the Bank has been reiterated in 
the interview conducted with governmental representatives, other donors as well as World Bank staff. 
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Strategy (NWSS) will be compared. The main findings are presented in Table 210.  Through the 
comparison, it is evident that the Bank’s emphasis on market-based approaches was transposed into 
policy planning and legislation. Both Law 221 and the NWSS have a broader agenda than the WRSS, 
though, as they cover some social and environmental aspects that are not considered in the WRSS.  
 
This section will explore two key concepts of global water governance – namely good governance and 
the marketization of, or market-based approaches to, the water sector. While the objectives of both 
Law 221 and NWSS are in line with neo-liberal governmentality, they remain vague and leave much 
space for manoeuvre in how they are to be implemented in the specific context of Lebanon. As I shall 
later argue, the implementation of these ideas is a highly contested process of adjusting, modifying 
and transforming them (Mollinga 2008b). The case of the Lebanese water sector further illustrates 
how supposedly universal ideas are modified to reflect the realities of a specific context.  
 
In light of the political and economic realities, it seems as if global water governance is “more an ethos 
or an ethical ideal, than a set of completed or established institutions” (Dean 1997:213). 
                                                          
10 The 2003 World Bank Water Resources Sector Strategy serves as example of WB policy. Instead of using the 1993 
Water Resources Management Policy Paper, this thesis uses the 2003 Strategy as reference. The process of formulating 
the 2003 Strategy began in 1999, and thus represents the zeitgeist of the time better than the 1993 Strategy. Law 221 
and the NWSS are the two main legislative and policy documents, stemming from the reform process. 
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Table 2: Comparison of the World Bank’s 2004 Water Resources Sector Strategy (WRSS), Law 221 and the 2012 National Water Sector Strategy (NWSS) in Lebanon 
 
Table 2: Comparison of the World Bank’s 2004 Water Resources Sector Strategy (WRSS) , Law 221 and the 2012 National Water Sector Strategy in Lebanon 
 World Bank WRSS Law 221 NWSS 
Objectives Poverty Alleviation through efficient and 
sustainable resources development and 
management, as well as service delivery (5) 
 
Particular focus on water & & economic 
development 
For “the hydraulic natural resources’ protection 
and development within the environment and 
ecosystems protection” 
“Ensure water supply, irrigation and sanitation services over 
all of the Lebanese territory on a continuous basis and at 
optimal service levels, with a commitment to environmental 
(water quality and pollution), economic and social 
sustainability” 
 
“A right for every citizen, a resource for the whole country” 
Mechanism Approach/ strategy 
 
 “The main management challenge is not a 
vision of integrated water resources 
management but a “pragmatic but principled” 
approach that respects principles of 
efficiency, equity and sustainability while 
recognizing that water resources 
management is intensely political and that 
reform requires the articulation of prioritized, 
sequenced, practical and patient 
interventions” (3). [principled in terms of 
economic principles of viability; pragmatic as 
specific to contextual conditions] 
 
 Infrastructure development and resources 
management “In most developing countries 
both management improvements and priority 
infrastructure have essential and 
complementary roles in contributing to 
sustainable growth and poverty reduction” 
(12) 
Legislation Policy 
 
 Infrastructure development and resources management 
(including water supply, irrigation, wastewater) 
 
 IWRM as guiding principle with own strategic roadmap 
as outlined in NWSS 
 
Good 
Governance 
 
Define and establish clear institutional framework 
through laws, rights, licenses, standards 
responsibilities with appropriate management 
instruments, including regulatory arrangements, 
financial instruments, standards and plans, 
mechanisms for effective participation of 
stakeholders, and knowledge and information 
Predictable, open and enlightened policy making 
Clearly established roles and responsibilities of 
the Ministry of Energy and Water, as well as of 
the Water Establishments 
 
Professional Ethos 
The WE have “the status of a moral entity” 
Predictable, open and enlightened policy making 
 Objective 3.3.1: Full implementation of water sector 
reforms and improvement of performance and 
cooperation of WE and MoEW; inter-agency 
coordination 
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systems that increase transparency; motivate 
effective water allocation, use and conservation; 
and secure maintenance and physical sustainability 
of the water resources systems” (13) 
 
Accountability and Transparency 
The WE “will hire the services of an audit 
company, which mission consists of the 
preparation of a report on the financial status 
and closing accounts as well as on the internal 
regulatory system” of the respective WE 
 
The WE will be subjected to “a posteriori” 
control of the Court of Audit and the 
Performance Evaluation Committee of the 
MoEW and MoF 
 
Stakeholder Participation 
Not mentioned 
 “Develop adequate legal, institutional and regulatory 
setting to promote private sector participation in a way 
that serves the interests of Lebanon” 
 
Accountability and Transparency 
 Objective 3.3.3: Enhance and modernize legislation and 
regulatory regime to support the implementation of 
NWSS  
 Objective 3.3.3: Enforce a regulatory regime to oversee 
the continuous improvement of sector performance 
(including performance monitoring and evaluation) 
 
Stakeholder Participation 
 Improve management of irrigation sectors, mainly 
through creation of Water Users Associations to replace 
different organizations currently in charge of O&M of 
irrigation systems 
 Public outreach and awareness programmes to promote 
gradual implementation of consumer metering and 
higher efficiency plumbing devices 
 Provide customer service 
Market-Based 
Approaches to 
Water 
Management 
“Market-oriented reforms (which are often decried 
as “anti-poor”), when well-designed, can be the 
basis for growth and opportunities for the poor" 
(9) 
 
Cost Recovery 
Through “financially sound, operationally efficient, 
consumer-oriented water and sanitation utilities” 
(19) 
 
Water Pricing 
Determine appropriate price for water according 
to user-pays-principles, while ensuring 
accountability & efficiency of water service 
provider (23)  
 
Private Sector Participation 
“The insertion of the private sector … provides a 
powerful incentive to change” (45) 
Cost Recovery 
The WE will “operate within an administrative 
and financial autonomy”; budget is based on 
business plan and generated through tariff 
collection 
 
Water Pricing 
The WE “will propose drinking, irrigation water 
and WW services tariffs taking into consideration 
general socio-economic conditions of the 
country” (Amendment Law 337) 
 
Obligation of payment by subscribers in 
exchange for guaranteed minimum access to 
good-quality water (By-Laws) 
 
Private Sector Participation 
Not mentioned 
 
Cost Recovery 
 Objective 3.3.1: Improve on the management model 
between WEs and MEW and improve capital spending 
efficiency 
 Objective 3.3.2: Gradually achieve full cost recovery 
 
Water Pricing 
 Objective 3.3.2: Introduce and implement new tariff 
strategy for water supply ( fixed charge plus 
progressive volumetric tariff) and wastewater ( cost 
analysis to cover minimum O&M) 
 
Private Sector Participation 
 Objective 3.3.2: Promote private sector participation via 
Public Private Partnerships in operations and in capital 
projects 
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Mentioned twelve times 
 
Stakeholder Participation 
 In form of public-private partnerships or 
water user associations (9) 
 Stakeholder participation, co-management 
and shared ownership to treat water as social 
and economic good 
 
 
Wastewater Wastewater management as part of development, 
maintenance and operation of infrastructure (1) 
 
Natural sequencing of demand: people first want 
water, then sanitation, then wastewater disposal 
(19) 
 
Increased investments in wastewater sector 
“Since the setting of wastewater goals and 
standards is the responsibility of river basin 
authorities and other public water resources 
management agencies, close coordination is 
required between utilities and these bodies” (20) 
 
Facilitate better coordination between policy-
makers and utilities as part of broader 
development of institutions, governance 
arrangements and incentive policies for efficient 
and equitable water management (20) 
Amendment Law 337 introduces wastewater 
management to general water management 
plans “to establish the General Planning Project 
for hydraulic resources allocation, reparation 
among drinking and irrigation water usage on 
the national level as well as to prepare the 
National Water and Wastewater General Master 
Plan and update it continuously, and submit it 
through the Council of Ministers to be approved” 
to set quality standards and control for 
wastewater to initiate planning of wastewater 
treatment plants 
 
Depending on WE/ WE North Lebanon states 
“No subscription applicant or potable water 
beneficiary could be supplied with water if he 
does not have an acquittal regarding the 
payment of connecting his real estate to the 
wastewater collection network during or after its 
building” 
Increase coverage of wastewater collection networks and 
treatment capacities 
 
Optimize current wastewater treatment processes and 
sludge disposal, and ensure adequate reuse of treated 
effluents where applicable 
 
Introduce tariff for wastewater services (in proportion with 
used volumes of water supply) 
 
Collection and treatment to at least preliminary level of 80% 
of wastewater by 2015, and of 95% by 2020 
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4.1. Good Governance 
 
One of the goals of the water sector reforms in Lebanon is the implementation of good 
governance principles. As the name indicates, good governance refers to the quality of 
governance (Doornbos 2010). This raises the question of what makes governance good. For 
the World Bank, good governance is  
 
Epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy-making; a 
bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of 
government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law 
(World Bank 1994).  
 
The World Bank lays out its vision of how institutions should be structured and operated. It 
links the Bank’s work in the development sector to a set of conditions and prescriptions for 
political and administrative reform. In this sense, the World Bank recognizes the political 
dimension of governance, but tries to de-politicize the process of governing by applying 
formulaic and seemingly apolitical principles of good governance (Mollinga 2008b). Good 
governance can hereby be understood as a “technology of governance”, a means to 
transforming governance structures and processes to conform to an ideal (Larner 2000:12). 
Change is reduced to superficial institutional reform without addressing the underlying power 
relations, interests, values, norms and ideas.  
 
This is the same line of argument as in the National Water Sector Strategy (NWSS), one of the 
key policy documents of the reforms. The NWSS reflects well the first and second clause of the 
Dublin Principles that call for effective and participatory management of water resources 
(WMO 1992). It outlines a number of actions to be taken, striving for a) more accountability 
and transparency, b) more stakeholder participation, and c) an adequate institutional, financial 
and legal framework for water management that promotes private sector participation. 
 
More Transparency and Accountability 
 
Good water governance implies that decision-making processes are made transparent and 
accountable with the goal of being “practical, implementable and therefore sequenced and 
prioritized actions that can lead to that end” (WB 2003, 37). The end, of course, is the efficient, 
equitable and financially sustainable management of water resources – as defined in the WRSS 
(Ibid.). In Lebanon, both Law 221 and the NWSS introduce a number of structural and 
procedural changes to develop a more transparent and accountable governance system. This 
includes the hiring of an audit company to review the financial accounts of the WE as well as 
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“posteriori” control of the Court of Audit and the Performance Evaluation Committee of the 
MoEW and MoF (Law 221). The NWSS also calls for further steps to enhance, modernize and 
enforce legislation and a regulatory regime in the water sector (MoEW 2012). 
 
More Stakeholder Participation 
 
Good governance also means that stakeholders, especially consumers, become more involved 
in water resource management. Ideally, this will provide the space for contestation and 
negotiation, resulting in a nexus for different actors to “consensually and communicatively 
integrate decisions” into governing structures and processes (Saravanan et al. 2009). For the 
World Bank, however, stakeholder involvement is little more than an “appropriate 
management instrument” in the form of public-private partnerships or water user associations 
(WB 2003, 13). Similarly, stakeholder involvement in Lebanon has been very limited. Goal 1.8 
of the NWSS mentions cooperating with Water User Associations (WUA) on irrigation schemes, 
but does not go beyond that (2012). The strategy includes public outreach and awareness 
programme to gain acceptance and implement consumer metering and a new tariff strategy 
for water supply and wastewater services. The water user is seen as costumer. Law 221 does 
not even mention stakeholder involvement or participation. In the case of Lebanon, 
stakeholder participation is reduced to the mere minimum, failing to realise the innovative and 
transformative potential of civil society. 
 
Clear institutional, financial and legal framework: key actors 
 
Good governance requires a clear institutional, financial and legal framework with clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities of the main actors (OPM & CIPFA 2004). The reforms in the 
Lebanese water sector aimed to clearly demarcate the formal roles and responsibilities of the 
MoEW and WE. Furthermore, the NWSS elaborates on the role of foreign and local funding 
(which involves donor agencies, MoF, CDR, CoS, and HCD), monitoring and evaluation (which 
involves MoEW and MoF). As indicated in Figure 3, this offers a somewhat simplified view on 
the water sector as roles and responsibilities are described without accounting for the 
historically contingent and internally contradictory aspects of governance. As a result, the 
scope of the water reforms has been limited to a few, obvious actors (Saravanan et al. 2009).  
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Figure 3: Main actors and their interrelationships in the Lebanese water sector as described by Law 221 
and the NWSS – Actors and interrelationships; the width of the arrows indicates the degree of influence 
of these actors 
 
 
 
There are, however, a number of other key actors, or groups of actors, involved in water 
governance as listed in Table 2. Among them are the Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (CRD), the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), 
the Council of the South (CoS), municipalities, NGOs and media outlets. Notably, there is a 
significant fragmentation of responsibilities for investment planning and implementation. CRD, 
MoF, CoS and donor organizations are largely responsible for the allocation of funds. Ideally, 
policy-making and planning should go hand-in-hand, but coordination between government 
agencies is poor (WB 2015). Responsibility for the construction, operation and management of 
infrastructure is split among multiple government entities. Attempts to shift towards a more 
service-oriented model of water management in the WE have been partial at best. In other 
words, the reforms have not yet succeeded in establishing a clear institutional, legal and 
regulatory framework for the sector. Instead they have prescribed to a model of governance 
that promises efficiency, transparency and financial sustainability, but disregards some of the 
inherent complexity, ambiguity and contingency of the system that ultimately determines its 
outcomes (Dean 2007).  
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Table 2: Roles and responsibilities of key actors in the Lebanese water sector (extended list; beyond the scope of Law 221 and NWSS) 
 
Role CDR MoEW MoF MoE MoA 
(irrigation) 
MoPH 
(drinking 
water) 
Municipalities WE WB Donors NGOs Research Media Water 
Users 
Funding X  X     Cost 
recovery? 
X X     
Policy & Strategy X 
Master 
Plan 
X 
National 
 X X X  X 
Regional 
X X  X   
Planning X X   X   X X X  X   
Contracting/ 
Constructing 
X X   X  X X X X X    
Development & 
Implementation 
X X     X X  X X    
Operation & 
Maintenance 
X      X X  X     
Tariff/ Tax 
Collection 
  X    X X 
Propose 
tariffs 
     X 
Legislation, rules 
and regulation 
 X  X X X     X 
Lobby 
X   
Services & 
interactions with 
water users 
 X  X X  X   X X  X X 
Monitoring & 
Evaluation 
 X  X X X  X  X X X   
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4.2. Market-Based Approaches to Water Management 
 
The Dublin Conference marked a shift towards market-based approaches to water 
management. The fourth principle of the Dublin Statement about water as an economic good 
played a central role in developing policy and management strategies. In the context of 
Lebanon, the World Bank did not only encourage a political rationality of good governance, but 
has also pushed hard for privatization. It has since revised its position in support of “market-
oriented reforms” that include cost recovery, water pricing and private sector participation 
(WB 2003, 9). These ideas have underpinned the water sector reforms, aiming to re-structure 
the water sector for ‘more market’ (Larner 2000). 
  
There has been much resistance to privatization at the level of government in Lebanon, so it 
has never been included in Law 221 or the NWSS (Kunigk 1998/9). Any attempts to include it 
in the law were blocked by the Lebanese parliament (Interview 1, 2, 4, 8)11. Nevertheless, Law 
221 (2000) establishes that the WE will operate within administrative and financial autonomy, 
meaning that the WE will have to recover costs by charging customers for water services in 
order to be operational. There have not yet been any set tariffs for wastewater services, but 
the NWSS (MoEW 2012) has made it one of its main goals.12 The NWSS also outlines a plan to 
gradually involve the private sector in O&M and capital investment projects. It foresees an 
expansion of private sector responsibilities from service and management contracts (as they 
already exist for many networks and WWTP) to Build-Own-Operate Divestiture. A much greater 
role in policy-making, administration and implementation is thereby assigned to private 
economic actors (Swyngedouw 2005). Water users (or any other civil society actors) do not 
play any perceptible role in the governing of water resources13. Water users, if anything, are 
customers.  
 
The market-based approach to water management by the World Bank has led to the 
commercialisation of water utilities and increased involvement of the private sector 
Consolidating neo-liberal ideas of governance, the market is portrayed as the most effective 
                                                          
11 A good analysis of the attitude of the Lebanese government towards the reforms has been carried out by 
Kunigk, Emmanuelle. (1998/99). “Policy Transformation and Implementation in the Water Sector in Lebanon: 
The Role of Politics”. SOAS Occasional Paper No.27. 
12 First of all, the WE will try to introduce and implement a new tariff strategy for water supply (as fixed charge 
plus progressive volumetric tariff) and wastewater for which it will first conduct a cost analysis to cover 
minimum O&M. 
13 Both, the WRSS and the NWSS, mention the need for stakeholder participation. The WRSS talks about 
stakeholder participation as management instrument (pg. 13). Goal 1.8 of the NWSS hopes to “involve” 
stakeholder participation. 
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means to water resource governance (Dean 1997). Nevertheless, these ideas have proven 
difficult to implement given the specific historical-institutional context of intricate power 
relations, interests and ideas.  
 
For instance, a first attempt at a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in Lebanon was initiated in 
the City of Tripoli from 2003 and 2007 as part of the ongoing reform process in the water 
sector. The multinational company Suez-Environnement was contracted as subsidiary to 
manage the drinking water services in the Tripoli Water Authority area (Allès 2012). The 
expected added-value of this PPP was that the company would make the much necessary 
changes and investments to improve domestic water supply services and to modernize public 
management structures, which seemed inefficient and unable to deliver reliable services (Ibid.) 
Moreover, introducing a private actor in water management would arguably help to tackle 
corruption and clientelism (World Bank, 2004; Bakker 2010; Jaglin and Zérah, 2010).  
 
In the case of Tripoli, however, local elites showed a remarkable resilience to changes in the 
management of the Water Authority. In Lebanon, privatization has often been perceived as 
serving the commercial and political interests of the ruling elites14 (Leenders, 2004). As 
Christèle Allès argues, local elites15 and clientelist networks also played a role in the PPP in 
Tripoli, and its eventual termination (2012). She finds that prior to the PPP, local elites often 
served as intermediaries between water authorities and water users. They also intervened in 
the allocation of public work contracts and jobs, a powerful lever of patronage among the 
Tripolitan politicians and businessmen (Ibid.). Following the PPP agreement, local elites 
continued to interfere in the management of the Water Authority. This eventually led Suez-
Environnement to withdraw from the arrangement. 
 
It should be noted, however, that with the merging of the Tripoli Water Authority into the 
North Lebanon Water Authority, however, there was a change in technical and executive staff 
(including the Director General) and the involvement of a wider range of Tripolitan leaders (by 
confession/ family) and an extension of services. This allowed for a transformation of powers 
within and access to the water administration. The performance and service delivery of the 
utility itself did not change significantly.  
 
                                                          
14 At the time, Tripolitan leaders played an important role in national politics. During the contract period, Omar 
Karamé and Najib Mikati held the post of prime minister. Another Tripolitan leader, Muhammad Safadi, was 
Minister of Energy and Water towards the end of the management contract period. 
15 For instance, Tripoli was ruled by Sunni leader Omar Karamé, who also controlled the water administration. 
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Based on this review of policy documents, it can be concluded that there has been an uptake 
of certain ideas and principles. However, the implementation of the reforms itself is a political 
process of contestation and negotiation that is shaped by different, often contradictory power 
relations, interests, values, norms and ideas (Saravanan et al. 2009; Larner 2000). It is therefore 
crucial to take a closer a look at the different interests, ideas and interrelationships in order to 
understand why the water sector continues to face significant challenges in Lebanon 
(Swyngedouw 2005; Bakker 2003; Harvey 2003). 
 
An analysis of the political economy will provide additional insights into the underlying 
economic and political interests and relations, as well as the means by which subjects are 
governed. What governing rationality underlies the current water sector reforms and how do 
they affect governance arrangements in regard to wastewater? Who are the key actors in the 
wastewater sector? What interests, incentives and structures have supported, or hindered, 
change in the way wastewater is managed?  
5. Defining the Lebanese Wastewater Sector 
  
This section aims to define the wastewater sector in Lebanon by mapping out the key actors 
and their interrelationships. the main actors are identified (Table 2 and 3), and their roles and 
responsibilities, their interrelationships and influence in shaping water resource management 
strategies and practices are analysed. The mapping exercise serves to uncover some of the 
“hidden” actors in the Lebanese water sector and the wastewater sub-sector (Moncrieffe & 
Luttrell 2005). Noting a discrepancy between supposed and actual roles and responsibilities, 
who are these “hidden” actors and how influential are they? 
 
Although one of the main objectives of the reforms has been to clearly define the roles and 
responsibilities of key actors in the sector, there is a considerable difference between what 
they should be doing and what they are doing. “Role” hereby refers to the function of an actor 
in a system. The water sector reforms in Lebanon have been particularly focused on the role of 
the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) and the Water Establishments (WE), transferring 
responsibilities from the former Water Authorities (WA) to the four WE and the MoEW. 
Nevertheless, the actual role and responsibilities of these two actors have deviated quite 
significantly from what has been prescribed by the reforms (Figure 4). 
 
30 
 
 My critique is not so much about the fact that the governance system does not conform to an 
ideal type as desired by the reformers, but rather that a system is imposed without taking into 
account the existing political, economic, and cultural power relations. Focusing on only a few 
key actors, the reforms disregarded some of the underlying governance structures and 
processes that have shaped the sector in Lebanon. As a result, there has been little change in 
actual practices.  
5.1.  Roles and Responsibilities 
 
The Council for Development and Reconstruction 
 
On paper, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is in charge of delegating 
funds for infrastructure projects in the water sector as it has done since 1977. The CDR was 
originally created to co-ordinate post-war reconstruction efforts. In order to do this, it was 
granted an ad hoc extra-ministerial status that exempted it from formal bureaucratic 
procedures (Adwan 2004). Essentially, this meant that the CDR could request extra-budgetary 
loans from the Central Bank without being accountable for them during external audits or 
checks (Leenders 2004). With a virtual monopoly over publicly financed reconstruction efforts, 
the CDR set out to become the government’s main instrument not only for financing, but also 
for planning and implementation (Denoeux & Springborg 1998). Under Hariri, the CDR’s role in 
development and reconstruction was even more dubious when it awarded Solidère, a private 
Table 3: List of Actors in the Water Sector of Lebanon 
Government Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) 
Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
Ministry of Environment (MoE) 
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 
Litani River Authority (LRA) 
Municipalities 
Public Utilities Water Establishments (WE) 
Donors World Bank 
Other Development Banks, like EIB, KfW, IDB 
Western Donor Agencies, like AFD GIZ, USAID, EC, Italian Cooperation, French 
Government, BMZ, UNFIL, UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA 
Arab Donor Agencies, like the Kuwait Fund, ADFD, AFESD, Islamic Relief 
Civil Society Water Users 
International NGOs like Halieus, YMCA, Mercy Chorps 
Lebanese NGOs, including IndyAct, Friends of Ibrahim Abd El Al, Greenline, 
Mubadarat or T.E.R.R.E. Liban  
Research Institutes and Universities, including the American University of 
Beirut (AUB), Lebanese American University (LAU), Université Saint-Joseph, 
National Council for Scientific Research (NCSR) 
Media, including L’Orient Le Jour, Al Bia Wal-Tamia, the Daily Star 
Private Sector Contractors 
Private Banks, such as Société Générale 
Private Water Companies, such as Nestlé, Coca-Cola, Ondeo-Liban 
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stock company partially owned by Hariri himself, with some of the most profitable and 
prestigious projects (Leenders 2004). Much has been written about this problematic mix of 
public and private interests (Leenders 2004; Dibeh 2005). Nevertheless, the CDR has remained 
the key actor when it comes to the allocation of funding, and in so doing, setting the agenda 
for investments in the water sector. 
 
Nominally, the CDR’s role is limited to the financial aspects of water management. It has, 
however, continued to be actively involved in funding, planning, constructing (e.g. contracting) 
and operating networks and treatment facilities. As most foreign funding is channelled through 
the CDR, it has acquired a de facto responsibility for planning, formally the responsibility of the 
MoEW (GTZ 2009). Foreign donors consider the CDR more efficient and experienced than the 
MoEW and, thus, continue to work through the CDR, further reinforcing its status as key player 
in the sector and beyond (Interview 7/8). Though the CDR claims to be consulting with other 
ministries and the WE, decisions are taken unilaterally and reflect the interests and ideas of 
the CDR. In brief, the role of the CDR remains unchanged as much of its influence derives from 
structural and procedural arrangements that have not been addressed by the reforms. 
 
The Ministry of Energy and Water 
 
The Ministry of Energy and Water has traditionally been in charge of both drinking and 
wastewater (GTZ 2009). As part of the institutional reforms, the role of the ministry was written 
into law, clearly outlining its responsibilities. The MoEW is legally obliged to develop and 
implement a national master plan for the water and wastewater sector. It is also responsible 
for the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects, the evaluation of water needs and 
uses, the setting of quality standards, the licensing of water permits, the control and 
monitoring of the WE, and public relations (Law 221). Although the influence of the CDR is 
ubiquitous, the MoEW is currently being re-organized to gradually take the lead in overall 
planning and programming (DG Environment 2006). As part of this re-organization, it has 
prepared the National Water Sector Strategy (MoEW 2012) and a draft law for the Code de 
l’Eau (MoEW 2005). However, the Code de l’ Eau has not been ratified.  
 
Moreover, the MoEW continues to depend on funding from the CDR and international donors, 
making it difficult to fulfil all its responsibilities as outlined in Law 221. The Ministry remains 
understaffed. For example, there are currently only five staff working on monitoring and 
regulating all of the water sector (Interview 10). At the same time, consultation and 
coordination efforts with other ministries are limited. On the whole, the MoEW is somewhat 
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overshadowed by the CDR, resulting in a less central role for the ministry than envisioned in 
the reforms.  
 
The Ministry of Finance 
 
The Ministry of Finance plays an important role when it comes to funding. Together with the 
MoEW, the MoF has financial oversight of the WE. It negotiates with foreign donors, such as 
the World Bank, the EIB or the IDB, about the volume and conditions of financial assistance 
(WB 2010). The MoF is also in charge of setting the budget for the different ministries, based 
on their submissions of draft budgets (Gaspard 2004). The budget is then subject to 
negotiations before it is approved as budget law by Parliament. This, however, is a highly 
contested process in Lebanon, so much so that there has not actually been a budget law since 
2004 (WB 2010). As it will be discussed later, the government budget is intricately linked to 
economic and political interests, strategies and decisions that go beyond the influence of the 
MoF. Nevertheless, the MoF is crucial in allocating the budget to different actors in the water 
sector, including the CDR, CoS, MoEW and other ministries marginally involved.  
 
The Ministry of Environment 
 
The Ministry of Environment is perhaps the most telling example of the discrepancy between 
supposed and actual roles and responsibilities. The role of the MoE has been specified in an 
elaborate framework of laws, rules and regulations for the protection of the environment (Law 
216)16. In 2005, the responsibilities of the MoE were expanded to include the preparation of 
legislation for environmental practices, to develop a set of indictors and standards to monitor 
private and public sector activities, and to carry out public awareness campaigns, conduct 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) and work together with NGOs on environmental 
issues (Law 690; DG Environment 2006). The legislative framework around the responsibilities 
of the MoE is surprisingly thorough. The actual impact of the MoE, however, is extremely 
limited as it ranks at the very bottom of the hierarchy of ministries. This hierarchy is by no 
means a formal arrangement, though the budget dedicated to the MoE is a good indicator of 
it low status (Gaspard 2004)17. In the wastewater sector, for example, the MoE has been 
notably absent from roundtable discussions. It has never approved any of the EIA conducted 
                                                          
16 Law 216 established the MoE to formulate environmental policy, propose measure for its implementation, 
and protect the environment in the interest of public health and welfare (DG Environment 2006). In regards 
to wastewater, the MoE was assigned with the task of creating sewage network standardization guidelines, 
and designing and implementing wastewater projects. There is, of course, room for improvement e.g. pollution 
control is currently limited to industrial discharges; there is no system for monitoring groundwater quality. 
17 In 2005, environmental expenditures as a percentage of the total budget amounted to 0.05%. In 2006, it even 
decreased to 0.04% (Abaza 2008). 
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to set up WWTP; the majority of which do not comply with the effluent standards set by the 
MoE anyways. The dismissive attitude towards the MoE has been reiterated by most 
interviewees that have described it as “powerless joke” (Interviewee 3) and “the who?” 
(Interviewee 8). Theoretically, the MoE plays an important role in regulating the water sector, 
but it lacks in status and resources to fulfil this role. 
 
The Ministry of Public Health 
 
Similar to the MoE, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) has a legal responsibility to monitor 
water quality and safety of drinking and wastewater, dating back to the 1930s. It also manages 
programmes related to sanitation and public health.18 Firmly established, the MoPH seems to 
fulfil its role and responsibilities as defined by law.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture is primarily charged with assisting at the farmer and the field level 
through extension services such as training, education and demonstration. The irrigation with 
treated wastewater is currently prohibited (Decree 8735 of 1974) and hence no standards for 
water reuse are established (EMWater, 2004), but as reuse is envisaged for the future, draft 
wastewater reuse guidelines have already been prepared by FAO (Bdour et al., 2009). As these 
guidelines have not yet been endorsed, no formal arrangements have been put into place to 
support and monitor the wastewater reuse in agriculture. 
 
Municipalities 
 
Traditionally, Lebanese municipalities have been responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of water supply networks, as well as drainage systems of both storm and 
wastewater. By law, they are required to build, maintain and control infrastructure for basic 
services (GTZ 2009). As a result, many municipalities have invested in, and legally own, sewer 
networks. The reforms, however, determined that the WE should take over the operation and 
maintenance of these networks, effectively disowning the municipalities (Interview 1). This 
decision was met with some resistance from the municipalities, and the Ministry of Justice had 
to step in and clarify O&M responsibilities.19 The municipalities were re-affirmed in their 
position, and continue to operate their own sewer networks and wastewater treatment 
facilities. They are also responsible for collecting taxes and tariffs, which further strengthens 
                                                          
18 A department and two divisions for primary health care at the Ministry of Public Health were created in 1996 
as stated in Decree 8908, Article 4. 
19 Legal opinion issued by the Ministry of Justice in 2004 (ref.918/C/2003) 
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their position vis-à-vis the Water Establishments. Finally, the CDR is implementing 
development projects on behalf of the municipalities funded through the Independent 
Municipal Fund (Decree 7425 of 1995). 
 
Water Establishments  
 
One of the main objectives of the reforms was the merging of twenty-one Water Authorities 
(WA) into four Water Establishments (WE), namely Beirut and Mount Lebanon Water 
Establishment (BMLWE), North Lebanon Water Establishment (NLWE), South Lebanon Water 
Establishment (SLWE) and Beka’a Water Establishment (BWE).20 The WE were entrusted with 
the overall management of water resources, the planning, funding and implementing of water 
resources development projects, the O&M of regional distribution networks, the monitoring 
of water quality, and the running of the WE according to principles of cost recovery through 
WE-specific tariff schemes (see By-Laws).  
 
As it stands, none of the WE are capable of fulfilling these responsibilities satisfactorily. Donor 
agencies, like the GIZ or USAID/ DAI, are assisting the WE in the overall management, but once 
these projects come to an end, the WE will be on their own. Planning and funding is currently 
carried out by the CDR and the MoEW, because the WE do not have the capacities or capital 
for any investments in the sector. The O&M of regional networks, as well as of pumping 
stations, WWTP and wastewater collection, is contracted out to private operators or done by 
the municipalities. The WE do monitor the quality of water, but this does not necessarily mean 
that they comply with standards. Finally, none of the WE – though BMLWE claims that it has – 
has achieved O&M cost recovery. Except for a few pilot areas, metering and volumetric tariffs 
have not been introduced yet, however essential they are for cost recovery. Consequently, the 
MoEW has to support the WE through informal subsidies, for example, by not charging the WE 
for electricity.21  
 
The World Bank 
 
The World Bank has been the main initiator and driving force behind the reforms. Formally, it 
has provided financial and technical assistance in accordance with its Water Resources Sector 
Strategy. The World Bank has also been engaged in numerous projects and programmes, 
developing infrastructure, strengthening institutions and improving water resources 
                                                          
20 The WE were established in Law 221, and amended in Law 241. A set of by-laws further specified the 
organizational structure and responsibilities of the WA. 
21 Since 2000, the MoEW has spent an average of $2.5 million per year on O&M of WE (World Bank 2010). The 
World Bank estimates that the hidden costs in supporting the WE amount to 0.5% of the annual GDP or more. 
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management (WB 2000). Nevertheless, its influence extends well beyond the bounds of its 
formal role. Not only does it lend credibility to projects, attract further investments, but the 
World Bank also gives out huge loans, putting it in a position from where it can dictate the 
terms and conditions (Kunigk 1998/99). This has been done by freezing loans as a means of 
pressuring the Lebanese government into complying with the Bank’s demands for water sector 
reforms as in 1992 (Kunigk 1998/99). Similarly, the 2012 National Water Sector Strategy was a 
precondition for further funds in the water sector, including a loan of US$ 474mn for a water 
supply development scheme in Lebanon (WB 2014). Given its economic and political influence, 
the Bank has played - and continues to play - a significant part in shaping water sector strategies 
and investments. 
 
Western and Arab Donor Agencies and Development Banks 
 
Because Lebanon is strongly dependent on foreign funding for development projects and 
programmes, donor agencies and development banks play an important part in allocating 
funds, planning and implementing projects. There are significant differences between donor 
agencies, however. In an in-depth study about their roles in the re-construction of Lebanon, 
Hamieh and Mac Ginty (2010) point out how Western actors have differed from Arab and Gulf 
states. Generally, Western donors have focused on “software” or governance programmes and 
projects to increase good governance and participation. Arab donors, on the other hand, have 
invested in “hardware” or highly visible infrastructure projects like bridges, roads, or dams 
(2010). Arab states were likely to spend money on favoured constituencies based on sectarian 
or partisan affiliations. As will be discussed in the next section, foreign funding is a highly 
political issue through which donors can influence policy and outcomes (Dibeh 2005).  
 
NGOs, research institutes and media 
 
International and National NGOs do not have a legally defined role in the water sector. 
International NGOs like YMCA or Halieus have cooperated with international donor agencies, 
like USAID and the EU, to carry out small-scale projects. YMCA, for instance, has set up several 
small-scale WWTP (USAID 2007). Halieus has worked on wetland restoration as part of a 
broader programme of decentralized development cooperation (Interviewee 5). As such, NGOs 
help with the implementation process of water sector strategies. Furthermore, some donors 
consult with NGOs at stakeholder meetings and roundtables, but with seemingly little impact. 
There are a few Lebanese NGOs, such as IndyAct or Friends of Ibrahim Abd El Al that lobby for 
greater environmental and social awareness in policy-making.  
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Similarly, several joint research and community projects are carried out in collaboration with 
Lebanese research institutes and universities, like the American University of Beirut and the 
National Council for Scientific Research, as well as governmental research organizations.  
 
The media - that is newspapers, journals, bloggers, TV and radio stations - regularly reports on 
water-related problems. The scope of this thesis does not allow for a more detailed analysis of 
the media coverage and portrayal of water-related problems. 
 
Private Sector 
 
Even though private sector participation is explicitly mentioned and a desired outcome of the 
water sector reforms, the private sector is largely absent. Private contractors are hired for the 
construction and O&M of water supply and wastewater systems, and some companies have 
worked together with municipalities and WE (e.g. knowledge transfer of technologies; 
trainings). However, large private investors have shied away so far with the exception of Suez-
Environment as described in the previous section. 
 
Water users 
 
A preliminary result of the interviews was the limited role of civil society actors in the 
governance of wastewater. Water users are not involved in policy formulation or 
implementation. As a result of the commercialization of the WE, a greater emphasis has been 
placed on water users as customers whose trust needs to be earned through improved services 
and customer relations (Interview 8). Nevertheless, access to water services is still low, and 
low-income households spend more on services, compared to the international average (MoSA 
2013). 
 
5.2. Interrelationships 
 
Comparing the supposed and actual roles and responsibilities of different actors, it becomes 
evident that the governance system of the Lebanese water sector involves many more actors 
with different roles than what official policy documents suggest (Table 3). Figure 4 summarizes 
the interrelationships and actual influence of different actors. Noticeably, there are several 
actors that seem to have strongly influenced governance structures and processes, but that 
have not often been mentioned in official documents (Hermans 2005). These are the “hidden” 
actors of the Lebanese wastewater sector.  
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First of all, the international donor agencies form a group of actors that is extremely involved 
in the financing, planning, constructing and managing of the wastewater sector. The CDR is 
another actor that stands out for playing a key role the sector, in channelling funding to 
projects, thereby setting the agenda for how these funds are spent. Furthermore, the 
municipalities serve as interface between water users and the WE. Not only do they own and 
operate municipal sewer networks, they are also expected to support the WE in collecting 
water and wastewater tariffs as part of a broader management strategy of cost recovery (GTZ 
2010). These “hidden” actors are indicative of a political dimension of governance that is 
characterized by political and economic power relations and interests and should be explicitly 
taken into account for the reforms to be successful.  
 
Figure 4: Main actors and their interrelationships in the Lebanese water sector in practice; the width of 
the arrows indicates the degree of influence of these actors 
6. Political Economy Analysis of the Water Sector in Lebanon  
 
First, the findings of the intra-sector analysis of the water sector in Lebanon are presented. 
They are based on an extensive literature review and interviews and analysed, using the DFID 
framework for political economy. The framework looks at the following: a) current institutional 
arrangements, b) historical legacies, c) structural factors, d) change processes, e) power 
relations, and f) ideologies, values and perceptions in order to get a better understanding the 
developments in the water sector (Moncrieffe & Luttrell 2005). The results of this analysis are 
summarized in Table 4.  
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Table 4:  Analysis Matrix of the Political Economy of the Wastewater Sector in Lebanon 
 
 Roles, Mandates, 
Responsibilities 
Organizational structure Management, Leadership, 
Composition 
Financing and Spending Incentives and 
Motivation 
Capacity 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 A
rr
an
ge
m
e
n
ts
 
See Section 5 
 
CDR as autonomous actors with 
access to extra-budgetary loans 
 
Commercial interests to operate 
pipelines, pumps, WWTP 
 
Informal economy of water 
supply 
 
PPP agreement in Tripoli with 
Ondéo‐Liban failed after 4 years 
 
Fragmentation politique et 
l’affaiblissement de l’Etat 
 
See Section 5 
 
Centralized context of policy 
making at ministerial level 
 
Some community-based 
projects, but no up-scaling 
 
“It makes no sense if NGOs 
do the work of government” 
 
limited horizontal integration 
of governmental institutions 
 
Coordination between 
donors 
WB, CDR and MoF channel 
funds to projects 
 
Water governance strategy in 
place but little high-level 
political pressure 
 
No independent monitoring 
agency 
 
Big gap between legal & 
regulative structures and 
implementation 
Mainly foreign funding 
 
Capital-intensive 
investments in 
infrastructure by govt/ 
donors 
 
Budget of WE = cost 
recovery 
 
Hidden subsidies as WE 
does not pay for electricity 
(officially written down as 
debt, but no payments are 
expected; MoEW covers 
difference) 
Relatively low collection 
rates because non-
payment, illegal tapping, 
inefficiency  
 
Aim of cost recovery 
 
Reliable 24/7 services as 
basis for good customer 
relations; trust and 
participation 
 
No specific working groups 
on wastewater; overlapping 
responsibilities 
 
WE need to build up 
capacities to contract, 
monitor, regulate private 
sector 
 
Brain drain 
 
Lack of basic data on water 
demand and needs, quality, 
customer needs 
 
Lack of human resources 
H
is
to
ri
ca
l L
e
ga
cy
 
Colonial legacy of Ottoman 
(centralization) and French rule 
(laissez-faire) 
 
WB from technical to managerial 
assistance; cautious to do 
assessments and consultations 
 
Council of South less active over 
the years 
 
Civil war reconstruction 
 
Sectarianism 
Post-Civil War influx of 
donors; gradually 
withdrawing 
  
Projects designed with risk of 
conflict/ uncertainty in mind 
 
Le règlement politique avait 
entraîné une compétition 
pour la redistribution des 
ressources de l’État à leurs 
clientèles respectives 
 
Tai’if agreement (balance of 
power) needs to be 
maintained when filling high-
up positions 
 
Sewer network has grown 
sporadically over time; little 
planning; little 
documentation 
Continued conflict impacts 
allocation of funds e.g. 
2007 Nahr el-Bared conflict 
caused reorientation of 
funds from South to North 
Question of ownership: 
municipality or WE 
 
Recruitment stop during Civil 
War; since 2009 difficult 
hiring procedure but 
recruiting again 
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St
ru
ct
u
ra
l F
ac
to
rs
 
Continued internal (treason, 
corruption, clientelism) and 
external (US, EU, Syria, Iran) 
conflict 
 
Water reforms: transferral of 
formal responsibilities 
 
Arab donors invest in respective 
confessional groups 
Mediterranean coastal line of 
interest of Europeans to 
cooperate on pollution and 
water quality  WW for 
coastal line 
 
Corruption 
 
Highly indebted = budgetary 
limitations and dependency 
on foreign donors = gives 
donors strategic advantage 
In Hezbollah-South, few 
large investments as high 
risk and unwilling to 
support Hezbollah  
decentralized solutions 
Unreliable electricity 
supply as incentive to use 
renewable energies or 
gravity to pump 
(waste)water 
Clientelism in recruitment 
process 
C
h
an
ge
 P
ro
ce
ss
e
s 
Challenge of implementing 
NWSS; ambitious goals for 
metering rates, cost recovery, 
reduction of leakages 
Slow reform process as each 
ministry is trying to hold on 
to as much influence as 
possible, e.g. wastewater 
management 
 
Central organisations like 
CDR, Conseil du Sud, Fonds 
Central des d´Déplacés, not 
formally in charge of water 
anymore – but money is! 
Western and Arab donors 
take over govt. functions; 
outsourcing of reconstruction 
efforts 
 
NGO ambitions to work with 
all does not reflect needs as 
Shiites need most help 
 
Municipalities find their own 
donors; keep WE out of loop 
 
Clientelism in allocation of 
funds 
Marketization of water 
services; cost recovery 
through commercialization 
of WE, participation of 
private sector  
 
Need funding for NWSS  
 
First wage increase since 
1996 in 2012 by 24% for 
employees, 32% for 
contractors  extra costs 
for WE 
 
Supply and demand-
management 
 
No incentives to actively 
and continuously monitor 
water quality 
 
MoEW turns blind eye to 
unlicensed well drilling 
but sinking water tables 
and subsequent saltwater 
intrusion are becoming a 
serious problem 
 
Tourism is affected by 
smell and unsightly rivers 
Metering introduced in pilot 
areas e.g. Saida, but tariff still 
paid as lump sum; problem of 
up-scaling 
 
Emphasis on training and 
technical/ managerial 
assistance 
P
o
w
e
r 
R
e
la
ti
o
n
s 
World Bank as initiator of 
reforms; according to WB: 
consultations and discussion in 
“mutual process” 
 
Ministerial hierarchies 
 
Funding from Arab donors often 
as grants; reflects political 
interests 
 
“In this country everyone 
tries to get as much influence 
as they can get. Even if they 
cannot handle it.”  
 
Most powerful WE in Beirut: 
water flow is money flow; 
little cooperation with 
donors; North WE as 
forward-thinking and 
responsible 
 
Case of farmers in Beka’a; not 
organized but upset by 
WWTP 
 
Civil society not organized or 
involved  
Donor agencies have strong 
influence on how money is 
spend  
 
CDR channels most funds, 
direct partner for many 
donors 
 
CoS (Shiite) demands part 
of budget  
Reforms transferred 
responsibilities to WE as 
central actor  loss of 
influence of local water 
authorities; municipalities 
fill gap 
 
 
 
Donor influence on policy 
formulations and 
implementation of projects 
 
Municipalities contest 
national policy e.g. ownership 
issue  
 
MoEW and MoE have 
monitoring role but do they 
the capacities to fulfil it? 
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MoEW vs. CDR – little 
collaboration and little vision or 
long-term strategy 
CDR is key actor as it 
manages relations with 
donors and money; thereby 
doing policy even though 
supposed to be only planning 
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Neo-liberal ideas of global water 
governance 
 
Non-interventionist state 
 
Economic and human 
development 
 
Attempts of river basin 
management of Litani – struggle 
between LRA and MoEW 
 
Attempts to mainstream IWRM 
(by WB and EU Group) 
 
Financial sustainability as 
baseline for WE (cost recovery) 
 
“Concerns for the environment 
have not quite trickled through 
yet” 
CDR pragmatism, e.g. EIA by 
MoE as requirement ignored; 
work without consent of 
MoEW; no expert consensus 
 
Is it justified to ask for 
drinking water quality 
standards for all piped water 
if only 2% of it is used for 
drinking?  reuse of 
wastewater 
US interest in Shiite support, 
anti-drugs so push for WB 
project in Baalbeck; high risk 
 
Basser: no man-made climate 
change  
Comair: dam diva 
 
Waste water is not highly 
prioritized as Plan B of 
pumping into the sea is less 
costly 
 
Profit-making paradigm 
prevails 
 
General distrust of World 
Bank 
From focus on quantity to 
efficiency, and quality 
“Civilized but uncultured 
people” 
 
Complacency 
 
“Parasites do not care 
about politics”  human 
health 
Demand management 
through metering & design of 
appropriate tariffs 
 
Commercialization of WE 
 
Engineer-dominated/ 
technical sector 
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In the previous chapter, three key actors and interrelationships have been identified as 
particularly influential in the water sector (Figure 4). These are the World Bank and donor 
agencies, the CDR and the municipalities. Focusing on these three actors, this section examines 
the political and economic interests and relations, as well as the means (or techniques) by 
which these actors achieve their objectives. The concept of governmentality is useful to explain 
in what ways these actors influence decision-making (Hajer 2003; Lemke, 2002). 
 
6.1. Donor Dependency 
 
The structural dependency of the Lebanese state on foreign funding puts donors in a 
strategically advantageous position from where they can set ‘the rules of the game’ (Hajer 
2003). In other words, the influence of donor agencies can partly be explained by the economic 
history of Lebanon, and partly by the active involvement of the donors in policy networks and 
projects. 
 
Because Lebanon is highly indebted, the budget for public expenditures is constrained, 
amounting to about 3% of the total GDP (WB 2010, 35). Only 0.5% of this is allocated to the 
water sector of which 23%, or 32 million USD, go towards the wastewater sector annually 
(number from 2008/ Ibid., 37). With a total estimated cost of building WWTP and sewer 
systems at 1 billion USD (GWI 2002) to 3.5 billion USD (MoEW 2012), the amount of public 
expenditure in the wastewater sector seems insufficient. Much of the funding of the sector, 
thus, comes from foreign sources as illustrated in Figure 5. This number is even higher when 
direct investments of donors in wastewater projects are taken into account. Seeing how much 
funding derives from foreign sources, it is fair to say that the Lebanese government is highly 
dependent on foreign funding for the wastewater sector. 
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Lebanon’s dependency on foreign aid has become a structural necessity not only for the 
wastewater sector, but for the economy as a whole (Dibeh 2007). Initially, foreign aid was given 
for development and reconstruction efforts after the civil war. By 1997, however, aid utilization 
had undergone a qualitative shift as it was now used for stabilization purposes (Ibid.).  Foreign 
aid was used to maintain balance-of-payments surpluses, which was increasingly difficult in 
light of large public expenditures and low taxes (Gaspard 2004).22 Also, foreign capital flows 
were diverted to reduce interest rates on growing public debt, while ensuring the necessary 
liquidity to continue borrowing funds (Dibeh 2007). Hence, foreign aid was used as a macro-
economic policy measure and as such acquired a highly strategic role in Lebanon’s political 
economy.  
 
Given the structural significance of foreign aid in Lebanon as source of project funding, as well 
as stabilizing policy measure in the overall economy, donor agencies have found themselves in 
an influential position to negotiate and set the terms and conditions for funding. Figure 6 shows 
the main donors in the wastewater sector.  
 
                                                          
22 Balance of payments increased from 0.3 billion USD in 1997 to 3.3 billion USD in 2002 (MoF 2003). 
Water Supply Wastewater Irrigation
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Figure 5: Source of Funding of CDR-Executed Investments (1992-2008)
Source: World Bank 2010 Public Expenditure Report of Lebanon
Foreign Fund Local Fund
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Acronyms: ADFD: Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 
EIB: European Investment Bank; EU: European Union; KFAED: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development  
 
 
All donors, except for ADFD, joined a coordination and consultation group together with other 
international organizations (UNICEF, UNDP, UNFIL, USAID, and the World Bank) and 
government organizations (MoEW, CDR and the Prime Minister’s Office) (Interview 7). 
Essentially, this group has formed a policy network that fits Swyngedouw’s description of 
“apparently horizontally organized and polycentric ensembles in which power is dispersed” 
(2005). Building upon a liberal norm of consensus and cooperation, this group, or policy 
network, seeks to create a common strategy for the wastewater sector (Walters 2004). They 
have, for example, developed the NWSS together (GIZ 2012). The NWSS pertains to the Dublin 
Principles, which are also reflected in other donor projects. Most of these projects aim at 
building a functional wastewater infrastructure as illustrated in Figure 7. Once in place, the 
focus shifts onto governance issues as exemplified by projects on good governance (SWIM), 
capacity building (GIZ/ USADI), and technical management tools (MED EUWI). Eleven of these 
projects explicitly mention IWRM as guiding principle. Rather than engaging with contesting 
viewpoints, the donor agencies seek “partners in a game of collective self-management and 
modulated social adjustment” (Walters 2004, 35). Of course, donors recognize different 
interests and views, but they try to “discuss” them in stakeholder meetings (GTZ 2009) and 
resolve differences in “mutual confrontation” (WB 2009). A potentially contentious process of 
policy formulation thereby becomes one of assimilation (Donzelot 1991; Williams 2004).  
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Figure 6: Foreign Funding for the Wastewater Sector 
by Donor (in %, 1992-2008)
Source: World Bank 2010 Public Expenditure Report for Lebanon
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This networked form of governance can be interpreted as a technique of governing through 
which the donor agencies can promote their particular governmental rationality (Lemke 2002). 
Donor agencies can promote their interests, ideas and values through the policy network and 
their own projects. In the case of Lebanon, this has largely been done through the 
implementation of good governance principles and market-based approaches to wastewater 
management. This networked form of governance, thus, helps consolidate a market-centric 
governmental rationality (Swyngedouw 2006). 
 
6.2.  Council for Development and Reconstruction 
 
The CDR, too, has been hugely influential in the Lebanese water sector and the wastewater 
sub-sector. As integral part of Hariri’s economic model for reconstruction and development, 
the CDR handled most of the investments both by the state and foreign donors, and allocated 
funding to projects it deemed important. The CDR is closely linked to the interests of the Hariri 
clan and thus, of a particular political-economic elite. 
 
Hariri’s economic model had two main objectives: a stable currency through re-evaluation and 
macro-economic stabilization measures, as well as reconstruction and infrastructure 
development (Denoueux & Springborg 1998). Specific emphasis was placed on the financial 
sector and the re-building of the capital Beirut (Ibid.). Physical infrastructure projects were 
prioritized over human development (e.g. investments in the education and health sector) 
(Dibeh 2005). In short, Hariri favoured a market-centric development model that provided 
visible and quick fixes for the economy. Politics were dismissed as “dispenser of patronage to 
sectoral interests” that could potentially block decision-making processes and effective 
governance (Denoueux & Springborg 1998, 161).  
 
8%
43% 28%
21%
49%
Figure 7: Types of Wastewater Projects 
(in % of total of 61 projects between 1996 and 2012)
Infrastructure & Governance
Governance Programming
Centralized Infrastructure
Decentralized Infrastructure
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This economic model was supported by a partly private, partly public governmental structure 
(Iskandar 2006). Hariri strategically put his business associates in charge of the Central Bank, 
the Ministry of Finance and the Governorship of Mount Lebanon (Denoueux & Springborg 
1998).23 Political and financial control of reconstruction and development plans was 
transferred to the CDR, which by then had a virtual monopoly over public expenditures (Ibid.). 
The CDR was closely associated with the private company Solidère, awarding it with some of 
the most profitable reconstruction projects (Leenders 2004; Young 1998). In order to finance 
the reconstruction process, the government sold treasury bills (T-bills) to Lebanese banks that 
made profits of the high interest rates of these T-bills (Kisirwani, n.d.). The single largest owner 
of stocks of Lebanese banks was Hariri himself, who benefitted from the profits the bank’s 
made of Lebanon’s increasing debt. Through the process of reconstruction, Hariri and his 
associates were able to push through their economic and political interests, and thus, 
fundamentally shape the development of the country (Denoueux & Springborg 1998). 
 
 
 
 
Without any substantial driver of the economy, this model quickly ran into problems. Public 
debt was increasing as were the expenses on debt repayments and salaries (Denoueux & 
Springborg 1998). This left only a small percentage of the public budget for capital investments, 
further slowing down economic growth (Leenders 2004). Menawhile, the CDR continued to 
take out extra-budgetary loans from the Central Bank and thus, maintained a significant 
influence over project financing and planning. There are no publicly available documents on 
                                                          
23 Riyad Salameh had handled Hariri’s finances at Merrill Lynch and was now in charge of the Central Bank. 
Fuad Siniora had been the chief financial officer for Hariri’s enterprises and became the Minister of Finance. 
Suhail Yamut formerly represented Hariri’s business interests in Brazil, and was appointed Governor of Mount 
Lebanon (Denoueux & Springborg 1998). 
32
22
2
3
2
12
Figure 8: Funding Channels for Wastewater Projects
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how much money the CDR has borrowed, but a 2007 report on budget reforms by the Ministry 
of Finance acknowledged the CDR as “one of the two the largest extra-budgetary entities” 
(MoF 2007). Moreover, the CDR handles the funds of 32 of 61 foreign-financed projects in the 
wastewater sector (Figure 8), and acts as main partner agency in 21 of them (Figure 9). The 
CDR continues to be involved in a significant number of projects, although the reforms had 
actually foreseen this role for the MoEW and WE.  
  
 
 
 
6.3. Municipalities 
 
As owners and operators of some of the existing water supply and a bulk of the sewer 
networks, the municipalities have a great stake in the water sector (GTZ 2010). Even though it 
is formally the responsibility of the WE, they continue to operate and maintain their supply and 
sewer networks and treatment facilities (Ibid.). The water sector reforms have largely 
overlooked the role of the municipalities, which are chronically underfunded (GTZ 2009). Some 
of the municipalities have, thus, tried to find alternative sources of funding to ensure and 
improve current infrastructure and services. Their efforts, however, have been constrained by 
a continued dependency on funding from either the national government or international 
donors.  
 
One example is the Assi River Project that aims to build a Phytodepuration pilot plant, an 
artificial wetland system, to reduce the impact of organic pollution from trout farming and to 
improve water quality (Trelaghi 2002). It is a joint cooperation project between Lega Pesca, the 
Italian Association of Italian Fishery Cooperatives, the Federation of Municipalities of Chouf 
21
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Figure 9: Partner Agencies Involved in Wastewater Projects in Lebanon 
(1996 - 2012)
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Souayjani, the Agency of Decentralized Cooperation, the Italian Cooperation, the Union of 
Municipalities of Hermel, the Cultural Association of Hermel, as well as an Italian university and 
a private research centre. In short, the project involves a number of stakeholders from different 
levels of governance (Cancellieri et al. 2009). The project is primarily financed through a grant 
by the Friuli-Venezia-Giulia region in Italy (Ibid.). As a main trading partner, the Friuli-Venezia-
Giulia region has a strategic interest in investing in Lebanon (Interview 5). In this case, there 
have not been any costs for the municipality of Hermel, because the Italian partner provided 
all of the needed funding in the form of a grant. Despite this being quite in innovative 
arrangement, the municipalities continue to rely on external funding. The reforms and key 
policy documents in the water sector do not address how municipal finances could be made 
sustainable.  
 
Similarly, the partnership programme between the Municipality of Bkassine (from the Jezzine 
caza) and the City of Lille has been established to support decentralized governance structures 
(MAF 2006). The WADI Urban Water Management Project, too, is an example of a cooperation 
project between municipalities – in this case of the Municipality of Pisa and the Federation of 
Municipalities of Chouf Souayjani (WADI 2011). These projects exemplify what Swyngedouw 
(2005) describes as governance-beyond-the-state. It involves the down-scaling of governance 
to the local level, creating “greater local differentiation combined with a desire to incorporate 
new social actors in the arena of governing (Swyngedouw 2005:1999).  
 
For instance, municipalities are increasingly confronted with the question of who pays for 
investments in public infrastructure and services. Both the Lebanese state and municipalities 
rely on foreign funding and international lending for the water sector and its wastewater sub-
sector (Figure 6; WB 2010). So even if the state subsidises public utilities, it would most likely 
involve external funding. Market-centric approaches to wastewater management suggest tariff 
collection to achieve cost recovery (WB 2010). This approach has been supported by many 
Western donors that have funded training for local staff on wastewater tariffs (USAID/DAI 
2007), as well as they supported the development of business plans based on a volumetric 
tariff system (GTZ 2009). Ultimately, these measures signal a shift towards a more market-
based approach to wastewater management.  
 
The political economy analysis makes apparent the specific context in which the wastewater 
sector is embedded. Donor agencies have been influential because of the Lebanese state’s 
dependency on foreign aid as a macro-economic policy measure to stabilize its own economy. 
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Continuing a tradition of laissez-faire policy, Hariri’s economic model of post-war 
reconstruction promoted a liberal market economy. Politics were dismissed for being overly 
political and ineffective, and the CDR was conjured up as institutional fix, granting it a virtual 
monopoly over publicly financed reconstruction efforts and exempting it from formal 
bureaucratic procedures. As such, the CDR became a powerful actor in the governing of not 
just the wastewater sector, but of Lebanon as a whole. Finally, the municipalities have 
maintained their traditional role of as owners and operators of municipal water supply and 
wastewater systems. They have, however, been constrained by the power asymmetries 
between the municipalities, the national government and international donors on which the 
municipalities depend on for funding. 
 
This has resulted in new forms of governance. Donor agencies and governmental organizations 
have formed into a policy network, reflecting a trend towards governance arrangements 
beyond-the-state (Swyngedouw 2005). The political economy analysis also provides insights 
into the contending interests and interrelations of political actors involved in the governing of 
the water sector. It shows how governance-beyond-the state has resulted in asymmetric power 
relations, empowering some actors (like the CDR) over others (like the public institutions that 
are meant to play the role of the CDR) (Swyngedouw 2006). 
7. Conclusion 
 
The thesis explores three central questions to the governance of the Lebanese water sector: 
In what ways have the ideas and principles of global water governance influenced the water 
sector reforms in Lebanon? Based on the review of three key policy documents, it can be 
concluded that there has been an uptake of good governance principles and market-centric 
management approaches as promoted by the World Bank. However, the implementation of 
the reforms itself is a political process of contestation, adjustment and transformation that is 
shaped by different, often contradictory interests, values and ideas (Mollinga 2008b). It is 
therefore important to understand who is involved in the implementation, why and how.  
 
Who are key actors, their roles and responsibilities, their interests and interrelationships, 
and their influence in the water sector? Understanding the political-economic dimensions of 
water governance helps to explain the power relations, interests, ideas and values that shape 
the water sector. The sector reforms in Lebanon focused on the role of the Ministry of Energy 
and Water (MoEW) and the Water Establishments (WE) in particular. There are, however, 
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numerous other actors involved in the governance of the sector, most notably the Western 
and Arab donor organizations, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and the 
municipalities. The thesis revealed that the actual role and responsibilities of these actors 
deviate quite significantly from what was envisioned by the reforms. 
 
How have existing governance structures and processes drive, or constrain, changes in the 
Lebanese water sector? Focusing on international donor agencies, the CDR and the 
municipalities, political economy analysis provided insights into the governance structures and 
processes that drive, and constrain, these actors. It concludes that the donor agencies have 
been influential because of the Lebanese state’s dependency on foreign aid as a macro-
economic policy measure to stabilize its own economy. Continuing a tradition of laissez-faire 
policy, Hariri’s economic model of post-war reconstruction promoted a liberal market 
economy. Politics were dismissed for being overly political and ineffective, and the CDR was 
conjured up as institutional fix, granting it a virtual monopoly over publicly financed 
reconstruction efforts and exempting it from formal bureaucratic procedures. As such, the CDR 
became a powerful actor in the governing of not just the water sector, but of Lebanon as a 
whole. Finally, the municipalities have maintained their traditional role of as owners and 
operators of municipal water supply and wastewater systems. They have, however, been 
constrained by power asymmetries between the municipalities, the national government and 
international donors on which the municipalities depend on for funding. 
 
The water sector in Lebanon is facing many challenges. Some can be resolved through 
infrastructure development, others through more efficient and inclusive water resources 
management. The water sector reforms were an attempt to tackle these challenges through 
new infrastructure, technical fixes and improvements in management. What the reforms did 
not address is what Karen Bakker and Michelle Kooy call “governance failure”, defined as “the 
failure to address the needs of poor households… and as undermining their capability to 
connect to the water system” (2008:1895). This is where more work needs to be done.  
 
How can the different actors in the sector be brought together to work towards a more humane 
system? Ensuring safe and reliable access to water and sanitation services for all. Ensuring 
competition and conflicts between water users are adequately addressed and no one is left 
behind. What kind of governance system is needed to achieve sustainability objectives in the 
water sector? A nuanced understanding of governance can help bring together a diverse range 
of actors to develop a more adaptive and sustainable governance system. 
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